Linguistic Anchors in the Sea of Thought by Clark, Andy
"Linguistic Anchors in the Sea of Thought" PRAGMATICS AND COGNITION vol 4 no 1 
1996 p 93-103 
 
 





Department of Philosophy 
Washington University 
St. Louis, MO  63130 






Andy Clark is currently Professor of Philosophy and Director of the 
Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology program at Washington University in St. 
Louis, Missouri.  He is the author of two books MICROCOGNITION (MIT 
Press/Bradford Books 1989) and ASSOCIATIVE ENGINES (MIT Press/Bradford 
Books, 1993) as well as numerous papers and four edited volumes.  He is an ex-
committee member of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science and of the 
Society for Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behavior.  Awards include a 
visiting Fellowship at the Australia National University, Canberra in 1989, and an 
ESRC Senior Research Leave Fellowship in 1992.  He is an Associate of 
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, serves on the editorial boards of the journals 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, PRAGMATICS AND COGNITION, and MINDS AND 






Linguistic Anchors p. 2
Language, according to Jackendoff (How Language Helps us Think -- this issue), is 
more than just an instrument of communication and cultural transmission.  It is also 
a tool which helps us to think.  It does so, he suggests, by expanding the range of 
our conscious contents and hence allowing processes of attention and reflection to 
focus on items (such as abstract concepts and steps in chains of reasoning) which 
would not otherwise be available for scrutiny.  I applaud Jackendoff's basic vision, 
but raise some doubts concerning the argument.  In particular, I wonder what it is 
about public language that uniquely fits it to play the functional role which 
Jackendoff isolates -- why couldn't expression in a private inner code induce the 
same computational benefits?  I suggest a weaker position in which the 
communicative role of public language moulds it into a suitably expressive 
resource, such that natural language emerges as the logically and technologically 
contingent filler of a functional role which could, in principle, be filled by other 
means.  I also compare and contrast Jackendofff's position with some related ideas 
due to Daniel Dennett and others, concluding with a sketch of my own view of 
language as an external artifact whose computational properties complement those 
of the basic biological brain. 
 
0. Beyond Communication. 
Jackendoff's powerful and thought-provoking paper (How Language Helps us 
Think, this issue) belongs in the camp of what I will call supra-communicative views 
of language.  These are views which depict language as substantially more than 
just a means of communicating  ideas and promoting collective learning and 
endeavor.  Language, on the supra-communicative view, is also some kind of 
computation-transforming instrument: a tool which allows biological cognition to 
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confront and solve an expanded class of problems and thus actually expands the 
realm of the thinkable. 
Supra-communicative views, though relatively rare, are not unknown in the 
literature, and one of my aims in what follows is to try to focus the ways in 
Jackendoff's position is special.  At the same time, I have some worries, largely 
concerning the considerable distance which remains between Jackendoff's 
intriguing ideas and any concrete computational model.  Closely related to this 
issue is a worry about the repeated claim that it is only through language that such 
and such becomes possible.  I shall try to tease out a few different ways of 
understanding such claims, and suggest that only a fairly weak reading can 
currently be justified. 
I begin (Section 1) by rehearsing some of the concrete questions which I 
think any supra-communicative view needs to address.  Sections 2 and 3 are a 
critical reconstruction of Jackendoff's argument, which highlights the points at 
which these questions need to be raised and pursues the precise contrast between 
Jackendoff's position and those of other supra-communicative theorists such as 
Dennett and Vygotsky.  I end (Section 4) with a rough sketch of my own, perhaps 
slightly different, take on some of these matters. 
 
1. Some Issues. 
A supra-communicative view of language, as I define the term, holds that the 
availability of linguistic encodings enhances our problem-solving capacities by 
somehow transforming the kind of computational space in which we operate.  This 
vague and wide definition can be filled out in a number of different ways.  Three 
ways are especially worth noting: 
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1. It might be held that exposure to linguistic inputs actually causes 
some kind of profound re-programming of the brain, creating a new 
kind of on-board computational device.  This, as I understand it, is 
Daniel Dennett=s view in Conscious Explained.  Dennett depicts our 
exposure to linguistic bombardment (in the context of some small and 
subtle differences in initial hardware) as causing the development of 
a special kind of on-board computational device viz. a kind of 
classical serial processor implemented in the substrate of massively 
parallel, broadly connectionist, neural machinery (see Dennett (1991) 
pp. 218-219, Dennett (1995) pp. 370-373). 
2. It might be held that the power of language lies in the fact that we 
quite literally think (sometimes) in words, and that it is the intrinsic 
properties of this representational medium which makes the 
difference (see Carruthers (to appear)).  This view is compatible with, 
but independent of, the Dennettian image of the construction of a 
new kind of on-board computational device. 
3. Or it might be that language, considered as an actual external 
resource (subsisting in speech sounds and real texts), provides a 
manipulative arena which allows operations which complement those 
of the basic biological brain, but are not replicated by it.  This kind of 
view (which happens to be the one I endorse -- see Section 4 below) 
needs, of course, to tell a special story about the obvious 
phenomenon of inner rehearsal.  The brains job, on this view, is to 
interface with linguistic media, but we need not assume either that 
thinking is literally conducted in words, or that linguistic bombardment 
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creates any profoundly different kind of computational device in the 
head. 
Which of these views, if any, is Jackendoff's?  I don=t think the text provides 
a clear answer, except insofar as we find a crisp rejection of option (2).  We return 
to this issue in Section 3 below. 
Other questions which a supra-communicative view needs to resolve 
include: 
C Is language essential to whatever range of computational benefits are 
being claimed, or is linguistic encoding merely one way to achieve 
e.g. a certain kind of precision, abstractness or manipulability?  
(Here, Jackendoff claims that linguistic encoding is essential -- but 
the issue is not, I believe, fully resolved as we'll see). 
C 
C Does the ability to manipulate and use language itself demand a 
special kind of on-board resource?  Or is language use ultimately 
supported by the same type of neural machinery (e.g. recurrent 
neural networks) used for other perceptual and motor tasks?  In other 
words, how deeply computationally different must the language-user 
already be, before the new tool can be exploited as Jackendoff's 
suggests? 
In the next several sections, I offer a partial reconstruction of Jackendoff's 
argument, noting when and where these issues arise, and suggesting some 
possible lines of development. 
 
2. Attention, Resolution and Anchoring. 
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Jackendoff clearly aims to go beyond a merely communicative view of language (in 
which its only role is to express thoughts), and usefully isolates a number of (what 
he calls) indirect effects of language on thought.  The effects are termed >indirect= 
to signpost the fact that Jackendoff emphatically rejects the idea that thought 
needs language.  Instead, his position is that language, when present, can feed 
and transform thought in various ways.  The key claim here is, it seems, that 
language makes thoughts available for attention and that this in turn opens up new 
possibilities of reflection and detailed analysis (see especially MS pp. 14-18). 
Underlying this vision (more on which below) is Jackendoff's controversial 
view that the deep cognitive processes which constitute thought are never 
conscious, and that what consciousness presents is some kind of echo (in linguistic 
images, or visual and other images) of these deep processes.  The consciousness 
of a monkey, on this picture, is limited to whatever contents/up shots of these 
deeper processes can be captured by images in various sensory modalities (visual, 
somatosensory, etc.).  Language-users by contrast, are able to be conscious of 
whatever contents/upshots can be linguistically expressed -- a much wider and 
more abstract realm of possibilities.  Unlike the monkey, we (Jackendoff says) can 
even be conscious of the steps of abstract reasoning, courtesy of the linguistic 
modality. 
Jackendoff claims that we can only attend to what is consciously present, 
and that as a result, availability to consciousness has real implications for problem-
solving activity (it=s not just an epiphenomenal choir repeating our thoughts).  This 
is the first point at which I want to enter a question mark.  For Jackendoff merely 
asserts that one can attend only to what is consciously presented.  But what kind of 
claim is this?  It is certainly not obvious why this should be the case.  I do concede 
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that the claim is phenomenologically well grounded.  But this leaves its force 
undetermined.  Could there be creatures for whom conscious presentation is not a 
pre-condition of attending?  Consider the kind of cognitive benefit that attention, on 
the Jackendoff model, supports.  Attention is said to enhance resolution at the 
attended location (in conceptual as well as perceptual space).  It is said to be 
useful for anchoring ideas, for stabilizing abstract concepts in working memory, 
and for individuating the elements of complex thoughts as distinct objects for 
further scrutiny.  These are worthwhile benefits, indeed.  But it is not at all obvious 
why they demand the presence of a public linguistic code.  Couldn't a device bereft 
of public language command a private inner code capable of expressing abstract 
ideas and making steps of reasoning available as objects of further processing?  
Attentional effects, in short, look to be logically and technologically independent of 
the presence of a public linguistic code.  Equally, they look to be logically and 
technologically independent of the presence of conscious awareness however it is 
supported.  Could not some computational device, lacking all conscious 
awareness, nonetheless engage in precisely the kinds of resource re-allocations 
(leading to enhanced resolution, etc.) which Jackendoff describes?  How, then, 
should we understand claims such as the following: 
Language is the only modality that can present to consciousness abstract 
parts of thought like kinship relations, reasons, hypothetical situations and 
the notion of inference.  Only through language can such concepts form 
parts of experience rather than just being the source of intuitive urges.@ 
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In what sense is it only through language that such ideas can become objects of 
conscious awareness and hence of attentional processing?  One weak, but 
plausible reading depicts public language as the contingent, but sole, filler of a 
specific functional role.  On this reading it just so happens that public language, in 
human cognition, provides a code which supports substantial abstraction and is 
consciously experienced.  Language is, as it happens, the modality which does this 
job in us.  But there is nothing intrinsic to the idea of a public language which 
implies that only a public code could support the kinds of computational benefit 
Jackendoff so usefully isolates.  Suppose, for example, that vision was the only 
sense modality by which we gained information about distant objects.  In such a 
case, vision would be the contingent but sole filler of a specific kind of functional 
role.  But it is a role which, we know, might also be filled (in different ways, but 
preserving the broad role of gleaning distal information) by hearing, radar and 
sonar. 
My guess is that Jackendoff intends something stronger -- some claim to the 
effect that public language is the only thing which could in principle fill the 
functional role he isolates.  But I do not see anything in the text (or elsewhere) 
which would work as an argument for this stronger conclusion.  My own view is 
thus that the relation between public language and the functional role Jackendoff 
describes falls well short of either logical or technological necessity, but may 
nonetheless be dictated by evolutionary and developmental constraints.  This idea 
is pursued in the next section. 
 
3. Why Publicity Matters. 
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What might it be about public language which fits it for the functional role 
Jackendoff describes?  One attractive answer, it seems to me, is that the 
expressive power of natural language has been molded by its role as a medium of 
public, interpersonal exchange.  In particular, we use public language for a variety 
of broadly normative ends involving practices of questioning and interrogation.  For 
example we ask someone to explain why they are pursuing a given course of 
action, we may question specific assumptions which someone looks to be making, 
we may ask why someone thinks X follows from Y, and so on.  This profile of 
interpersonal criticism is, it seems, a integral part of the cooperative use of 
language to promote so-called collaborative learning (see e.g. Tomasello et al. 
(1993)).  If public language evolved so as to aid interpersonal communication and 
cooperation, then these uses are, to coin a phrase, teleologically constitutive: they 
are of the essence of language qua evolved tool for collaborative endeavor. 
If we now place this teleological scenario beside some familiar, broadly 
Vygotskian, ideas, an interesting picture emerges.  For one powerful aspect of a 
Vygotskian treatment (see e.g. Vygotsky (1962), Berk (1994), Berk and Garvin 
(1984), essays in Diaz and Berk (Eds.) (1992)) is the notion that we come to 
internalize various public, interpersonal uses of language.  In particular, we learn to 
use inner linguistic rehearsal as a means of >thinking through= a problem, 
questioning our own strategies, staying on guard against common errors, etc.  
Recent studies of the self-directed speech of 5-10 year olds for example, found 
that such speech is largely keyed to the direction and control of the child=s own 
actions and increases when the child is alone and trying to perform some difficult 
task (Berk and Garvin (1984)). 
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Perhaps, then, it is no accident that it is public language which fills the 
functional role Jackendoff espouses.  For the original interpersonal role of 
language is what shapes it as a code suitable for interrogation, criticism, and the 
pursuit of reasons.  And it is these very properties which subsequently feature in 
the supra-communicative uses in which it functions so as to make complex and 
abstract trains of thought available for attention, self-inspection and self-criticism.  
If this were so, then public language would be the only evolutionarily plausible filler 
of Jackendoff's functional role: only a code developed so as to facilitate 
interpersonal criticism and cooperation would be likely to exhibit the powers of 
expression, reification and abstraction which subsequently enable the kinds of 
more sophisticated supra-communicative use with which we have been concerned.  
It has recently been suggested (Changeux and Connes (trans) (1995)) that higher 
intelligence is most clearly characterized by the presence of self-evaluation and 
self-criticism as waystations to increased efficiency and success.  It is satisfyingly 
unsurprising (given a broadly Vygotskian scenario) that it is beings graced with 
public language who most powerfully exhibit these very traits. 
 
4. Language as a Complementary External Artifact. 
The last issue I=d like to raise concerns the question: what kind of inner, 
computational mechanisms underlie the sorts of language-involving episodes 
which figure in this account?  Is the image one in which there exist some quite 
novel kinds of internal processing device supporting the phenomena of inner 
rehearsal and expression?  Or should Jackendoff's avowed commitment to 
evolutionary continuity (MS, p. 1) incline him to depict the inner mechanisms as 
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>more of the same= except this time targeted on the unusual domain of linguistic 
expressions and forms. 
It is exactly this issue which, for example, seems to divide Paul Churchland 
and Daniel Dennett.  Dennett, as we saw in Section 1, imagines inner linguistic 
rehearsal as the province  of a special type of device (a kind of virtual classical 
machine) installed in the brain courtesy of the extensive and rather profound re--
programming instigated by the acquisition and use of public language.  
Churchland, by contrast, insists (contra Dennett) that our manipulations of 
language require no more than the operation of so-called recurrent neural networks 
(see e.g. Elman (1993)) and that no radical re-organization of the inner realm is 
therefore necessary.  Unfortunately, Churchland does not go on to recognize the 
powerful supra-communicative roles of language, but instead rests content with a 
rather standard picture in which language is (just) an instrument of communication 
and collective endeavor.  But on the question of the kind of inner computational 
device needed to support our linguistic manipulations, my sympathies lie squarely 
with Churchland.  Notice, incidentally, that this is neither to deny nor affirm the 
independent proposition that language acquisition may require substantial innate 
biases in the learning device.  Rather, it is a question of what kind of computational 
device is needed to support the mature capacities of linguistic imagination which 
Jackendoff highlights. 
According to how we depict the inner cognitive machinery, we get a subtly 
different take on the way in which language turbo-charges thought.  If we suppose 
(with Dennett) that the relevant inner machine is of some radically different 
computational type, then it is as if language has parasitized and re-organized 
chunks of the brain.  If we suppose (with Churchland) that we are deploying 
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essentially similar computational resources for both linguistic and perceptual-motor 
tasks, then the way is open to treat public language as essentially an external 
artifact whose intrinsic dynamics complement (without fundamentally altering) 
those of the brain.  This, as it happens, is my own view of the matter (see Clark (to 
appear)), and I will end by offering the very briefest sketch of how it goes. 
Consider a common artifact, such as a pair of scissors.  The artifact is itself 
the result of a quasi-evolutionary process (design) in which the form of the artifact 
is adapted so as to be easily used and manipulated by the target users (typically, 
right-handed adult humans!).  The artifact does not deeply alter the user (although 
some muscles may develop to aid frequent use).  But the combination of the 
artifact's special properties and the user=s own nature creates an extended system 
(us-plus-scissors) capable of solving a new and interesting class of problems (e.g. 
straight-edge paper cutting). 
My own view is that language is, in this same sense, an artifact, one which 
has itself evolved so as to be easily acquired by young humans (perhaps exploiting 
processing biases inherent in the young -- see e.g. Newport (1990), Elman (1993) 
(see also Clark (1994), Christiansen (1994)).  And one whose on-line use exploits 
the very same kinds of basic computational resources we share with other animals 
and use for ordinary perceptuo-motor tasks.  To forestall immediate worries, two 
further comments are necessary. 
First, it is of course true that there is something special about human 
hardware that gets the process of language acquisition off the ground.  But that 
something need not amount to the presence of any special class of computational 
device (for a thorough treatment of the issues here, see Christiansen (1995)).  
Instead, it may simply consist in the freeing up of some resources, or in the 
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provision of some additional feedback loops for re-entrant processing (see 
Edelman (1992), Damasio (1994)), or some other small tweak which allows the 
fully fledged use of language to get off the ground. 
Second, we need to factor in the crucial use of language in interior 
monologue.  Here, the parallel with purely external artifacts (like scissors) breaks 
down.  But the point to stress is that the internalized uses of language may still be 
running on the kinds of simple recurrent neural network envisioned by Churchland, 
and that they may literally amount to an inner recapitulation of the expressive and 
manipulative resources we first encounter in public, interpersonal use.  Indeed, this 
is precisely the image suggested by the original treatment of these issues in 
Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986).  These authors describe 
some ways to manipulate and exploit external symbol structures and are led to 
comment that: 
We can be instructed to behave in a particular way.  Responding to 
instructions in this way can be viewed simply as responding to some 
environmental event.  We can also remember such an instruction and 
tell ourselves what to do.  We have, in this way, internalized the 
instruction.  We believe that the process of following instructions is 
essentially the same whether we have told ourselves or have been 
told what to do.  Thus even here we have a kind of internalization of 
an external representational format. 
Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and 
     
 Hinton (1986) p.47. 
 
The larger passage (p. 44-48) from which the above is extracted is, in fact, 
remarkably rich and prescient.  The authors note that the external formalisms 
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themselves are especially hard to invent and slow to develop, and are themselves 
the kinds of product which (in an innocently bootstrapping kind of way) can evolve 
only thanks to processes of cultural storage and gradual refinement over many 
lifetimes.  They also note that by using real external representations we put 
ourselves in a position to use our basic perceptual/motor skills to separate 
problems into parts and to attend to a series of sub-problems, storing intermediate 
results along the way -- a kind of operation which bears a striking resemblance to 
Jackendoff's image of language making the steps of reasoning available for 
attention and scrutiny. 
In sum, I would like to depict language as an external artifact which 
complements, but does not profoundly transform, our basic computational profile.  
Such complementarity seems to provide plenty of space for the kinds of indirect 
effect of language on thought which Jackendoff so ably displays.  An especially 
nice property of this kind of story, it seems to me, is that it may help us to build 
some bridges between the recent explosion of interest in the way biological 
intelligence couples with and exploits features of the local environment (see e.g. 
Hutchins (1995), papers in Artificial Life (1)1 (1994)), and more traditional interests 
in reasoning, logic, and high-level planning.  For language, if I am right, is the 
principal resource which allows human brains to reconfigure complex, abstract 
problem spaces into forms which will succumb to the basic, pattern-transforming 
skills of biological intelligence.  We are just ordinary animals with some small 
internal tweak and a very, very fancy tool: swimmers in the sea of words, thinkers 
in the shadows of the text. 
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